Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Non-Cooperative Systems
  based on Game Theory-Part I: Nash Equilibria by Scutari, Gesualdo et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
70
7.
05
68
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
4 J
ul 
20
07
Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for
Wideband Non-Cooperative Systems based on
Game Theory-Part I: Nash Equilibria
Gesualdo Scutari1, Daniel P. Palomar2, and Sergio Barbarossa1
E-mail: {aldo.scutari,sergio}@infocom.uniroma1.it, palomar@ust.hk
1 Dpt. INFOCOM, Univ. of Rome “La Sapienza”, Via Eudossiana 18, 00184 Rome, Italy
2 Dpt. of Electronic and Computer Eng., Hong Kong Univ. of Science and Technology, Kowloon Hong Kong.
Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, September 22, 2005.
Revised March 14, 2007. Accepted June 5, 2007.∗
Abstract
In this two-parts paper we propose a decentralized strategy, based on a game-theoretic for-
mulation, to find out the optimal precoding/multiplexing matrices for a multipoint-to-multipoint
communication system composed of a set of wideband links sharing the same physical resources, i.e.,
time and bandwidth. We assume, as optimality criterion, the achievement of a Nash equilibrium
and consider two alternative optimization problems: 1) the competitive maximization of mutual
information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power and on the spectral mask imposed
by the radio spectrum regulatory bodies; and 2) the competitive maximization of the transmission
rate, using finite order constellations, under the same constraints as above, plus a constraint on the
average error probability. In Part I of the paper, we start by showing that the solution set of both
noncooperative games is always nonempty and contains only pure strategies. Then, we prove that the
optimal precoding/multiplexing scheme for both games leads to a channel diagonalizing structure, so
that both matrix-valued problems can be recast in a simpler unified vector power control game, with
no performance penalty. Thus, we study this simpler game and derive sufficient conditions ensuring
the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, although derived under stronger constraints,
incorporating for example spectral mask constraints, our uniqueness conditions have broader valid-
ity than previously known conditions. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed decentralized
strategy by comparing its performance with the performance of a Pareto-optimal centralized scheme.
To reach the Nash equilibria of the game, in Part II, we propose alternative distributed algorithms,
along with their convergence conditions.
1 Introduction and Motivation
In this two-parts paper, we address the problem of finding the optimal precoding/multiplexing strategy
for a multiuser system composed of a set of Q noncooperative wideband links, sharing the same physical
resources, e.g., time and bandwidth. No multiplexing strategy is imposed a priori so that, in principle,
each user interferes with each other. Moreover, to avoid excessive signaling and the need of coordination
among users, we assume that encoding/decoding on each link is performed independently of the other
links. Furthermore, no interference cancellation techniques are used and thus multiuser interference
is treated as additive, albeit colored, noise. We consider block transmissions, as a general framework
∗This work was supported by the SURFACE project funded by the European Community under Contract IST-4-
027187-STP-SURFACE.
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encompassing most current schemes like, e.g., CDMA or OFDM systems (it is also a capacity-lossless
strategy for sufficiently large block length [1, 2]). Thus, each source transmits a coded vector
xq = Fqsq, (1)
where sq is the N ×1 information symbol vector and Fq is the N ×N precoding matrix. Denoting with
Hrq the channel matrix between source r and destination q, the sampled baseband block received by
the q-th destination is (dropping the block index)1
yq = Hqqxq +
Q∑
r 6=q=1
Hrqxr +wq, (2)
where wq is a zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian white noise vector with covariance
matrix σ2qI.
2 The second term on the right-hand side of (2) represents the Multi-User Interference
(MUI) received by the q-th destination and caused by the other active links. Treating MUI as additive
noise, the estimated symbol vector at the q-th receiver is
ŝq = D
[
GHq yq
]
, (3)
where GHq is the N ×N receive matrix (linear equalizer) and D[·] denotes the decision operator that
decides which symbol vector has been transmitted.
The above system model is sufficiently general to incorporate many cases of practical interest, such
as: i) digital subscriber lines, where the matrices (Fq)
Q
q=1 incorporate DFT precoding and power alloca-
tion, whereas the MUI is mainly caused by near-end cross talk [3]; ii) cellular radio, where the matrices
(Fq)
Q
q=1 contain the user codes within a given cell, whereas the MUI is essentially intercell interfer-
ence [4]; iii) ad hoc wireless networks, where there is no central unit assigning the coding/multiplexing
strategy to the users [5]. The I/O model in (2) is particularly appropriate for studying cognitive radio
systems [6], where each user is allowed to re-use portions of the already assigned spectrum in an adap-
tive way, depending on the interference generated by other users. Many recent works have shown that
considerable performance gain can be achieved by exploiting some kind of information at the trans-
mitter side, either in single-user [2], [7]-[9] or in multiple access or broadcast scenarios (see, e.g. [10]).
Here, we extend this idea to the system described above assuming that each destination has perfect
knowledge of the channel from its source (but not of the channels from the interfering sources) and of
the interference covariance matrix.
Within this setup, the system design consists on finding the optimal matrix set (Fq,Gq)
Q
q=1 accord-
ing to some performance measure. In this paper we focus on the following two optimization problems:
P.1) the maximization of mutual information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power
and on the spectral radiation mask; and P.2) the maximization of the transmission rate on each link,
using finite order constellations, under the same constraints as above plus a constraint on the average
(uncoded) error probability. The spectral mask constraints are useful to impose radiation limits over
licensed bands, where it is possible to transmit but only with a spectral density below a specified value.
1For brevity of notation, we denote as source (destination) q the source (destination) of link q.
2We consider only white noise for simplicity, but the extension to colored noise is straightforward along well-known
guidelines.
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Problem P.2 is motivated by the practical need of using discrete constellations, as opposed to Gaussian
distributed symbols.
Both problems P.1 and P.2 are multi-objective optimization problems [11], as the (information/
transmission) rate achieved in each link constitutes a different single objective. Thus, in principle, the
optimization of the transceivers requires a centralized computation (see, e.g., [12, 13] for a special case
of problem P.1, with diagonal transmissions and no spectral mask constraints). This would entail a
high complexity, a heavy signaling burden, and the need for coordination among the users. Conversely,
our interest is focused on finding distributed algorithms to compute (Fq,Gq)
Q
q=1 with no centralized
control. To achieve this goal, we formulate the system design within a game theory framework. More
specifically, we cast both problems P.1 and P.2 as strategic noncooperative (matrix-valued) games,
where every link is a player that competes against the others by choosing its transceiver pair (Fq,Gq)
to maximize its own objective (payoff) function. This converts the original multi-objective optimization
problem into a set of mutually coupled competitive single-objective optimization problems (the mutual
coupling is precisely what makes the problem hard to solve). Within this perspective, we thus adopt,
as optimality criterion, the achievement of a Nash equilibrium, i.e., the users’ strategy profile where
every player is unilaterally optimum, in the sense that no player is willing to change its own strategy as
this would cause a performance loss [14]-[16]. This criterion is certainly useful to devise decentralized
coding strategies. However, the game theoretical formulation poses some fundamental questions: 1)
Under which conditions does a NE exist and is unique? 2) What is the performance penalty resulting
from the use of a decentralized strategy as opposed to the Pareto-optimal centralized approach? 3)
How can the Nash equilibria be reached in a totally distributed way? 4) What can be said about
the convergence conditions of distributed algorithms? In Part I of this two-part paper, we provide an
answer to questions 1) and 2). The answer to questions 3) and 4) is given in Part II.
Because of the inherently competitive nature of a multi-user system, it is not surprising that game
theory has been already adopted to solve many problems in communications. Current works in the field
can be divided in two large classes, according to the kind of games dealt with: scalar and vector power
control games. In scalar games, each user has only one degree of freedom to optimize, typically the
transmit power or rate, and the solution has been provided in a very elegant framework, exploiting the
theory of the so called standard functions [17]-[22]. The vector games are clearly more complicated, as
each user has several degrees of freedom to optimize, like user codes or power allocation across frequency
bins, and the approach based on the “standard” formulation of [17]-[19] is no longer valid. A vector
power control game was proposed in [23] to maximize the information rates (under constraints on the
transmit power) of two users in a DSL system, modeled as a frequency-selective Gaussian interference
channel. The problem was extended to an arbitrary number of users in [24]-[28]. Vector power control
problem in flat-fading Gaussian interference channels was addressed in [29].
The original contributions of this paper with respect to the current literature on vector games [23]-
[29] are listed next. We consider two alternative matrix-valued games, whereas in [23]-[27], [29] the
authors studied a vector power control game which can be obtained from P.1 as a special case, when the
diagonal transmission is imposed a priori and there are no spectral mask constraints. Problem P.2, at
the best of the authors’ knowledge, is totally new. The matrix nature of the players’ strategies and the
presence of spectral mask constraints make the analysis of both games P.1 and P.2 complicated and none
of the results in [23]-[29] can be successfully applied. Our first contribution is to show that the solution
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set of both games is always nonempty and contains only pure (i.e., deterministic) strategies. More
important, we prove that the diagonal transmission from each user through the channel eigenmodes
(i.e., the frequency bins) is optimal, irrespective of the channel state, power budget, spectral mask
constraints, and interference levels. This result yields a strong simplification of the original optimization,
as it converts both complicated matrix-valued problems P.1 and P.2 into a simpler unified vector power
control game, with no performance penalty. Interestingly, such a simpler vector game contains, as
a special case, the game studied in [23]-[27], when the users are assumed to transmit with the same
(transmit) power and no spectral mask constraints are imposed. The second important contribution of
the paper is to provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the NE of our vector power control
game that have broader validity than those given in [23]-[27], [29] (without mask constraints) and, more
recently, in [28] (including mask constraints). Our uniqueness condition, besides being valid in a broader
context than those given in [23]-[29], exhibits also an interesting behavior not deducible from the cited
papers: It is satisfied as soon as the interlink distance exceeds a critical value, almost irrespective of
the channel frequency response. Finally, to assess the performance of the proposed game-theoretic
approach, we compare the Nash equilibria of the game with the Pareto-optimal centralized solutions
to the corresponding multi-objective optimization. We also show how to modify the original game in
order to make the Nash equilibria of the modified game to coincide with the Pareto-optimal solutions.
Not surprisingly, the Nash equilibria of the modified game can be reached at the price of a significant
increase of signaling and coordination among the users.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the optimization problems P.1 and P.2 are formulated
as strategic noncooperative games. Section 3 proves the optimality of the diagonal transmission and
in Section 4 the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the NE are derived. Section 5 gives a
physical interpretation of the NE, with particular emphasis on the way each user allocates power across
the available subchannels. Section 6 assesses the goodness of the NE by comparing the performance
of the decentralized game-theoretic approach with the centralized Pareto-optimal solution. Numerical
results are given in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8, the conclusions are drawn. Part of this work already
appeared in [26, 27, 30, 31].
2 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this section we clarify the assumptions and constraints underlying the model (2) and we formulate
the optimization problem addressed in this paper explicitly.
2.1 System model
Given the I/O system in (2), we make the following assumptions:
A.1 Neither user coordination nor interference cancellation is allowed; consequently encoding/decoding
on each link is performed independently of the other links. Hence, the overall system in (2) is modeled
as a vector Gaussian interference channel [34], where MUI is treated as additive colored noise;
A.2 Each channel is modeled as a FIR filter of maximum order Lh and it is assumed to change suffi-
ciently slowly to be considered fixed during the whole transmission, so that the information theoretical
results are meaningful;
A.3 In the case of frequency selective channels, with maximum channel order Lh, a cyclic prefix of
length L ≥ Lh is incorporated on each transmitted block xq in (1);
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A.4 A (quasi-) block synchronization among the users is assumed, so that all streams are parsed into
blocks of equal length, having the same temporization, within an uncertainty at most equal to the
cyclic prefix length;
A.5 The channel from each source to its own destination is known to the intended receiver, but not to
the other terminals; an error-free estimate of MUI covariance matrix is supposed to be available at each
receiver. Based on this information, each destination computes the optimal precoding matrix for its
own link and transmits it back to its transmitter through a low (error-free) bit rate feedback channel.3
Assumption A.1 is motivated by the need of finding solutions, possibly sub-optimal, but that
can be obtained through simple distributed algorithms, that require no extra signaling among the
users. This assumption is well motivated in many practical scenarios, where additional limitations
such as decoder complexity, delay constraints, etc., may preclude the use of interference cancellation
techniques. Assumption A.3 entails a rate loss by a factor N/(N + L), but it facilitates symbol
recovery. For practical systems, N is sufficiently large with respect to L, so that the loss due to CP
insertion is negligible. Observe that, thanks to the CP insertion, each matrix Hrq in (2) resulting
after having discarded the guard interval at the receiver, is a Toeplitz circulant matrix. Thus, Hrq
is diagonalized as Hrq = WDrqW
H , with W ∈ CN×N denoting the normalized IFFT matrix, i.e.,
[W]ij , e
j2π(i−1)(j−1)/N/
√
N for i, j = 1, . . . , N and Drq is a N ×N diagonal matrix, where [Drq]kk ,
H¯rq(k)/
√
dγrq is the frequency-response of the channel between source r and destination q, including the
path-loss dγrq with exponent γ and normalized fading H¯rq(k), with drq denoting the distance between
transmitter r and receiver q.
The physical constraints required by the applications are:
Co.1 Maximum transmit power for each transmitter, i.e.,
E
{
‖xq‖22
}
=
1
N
Tr
(
FqF
H
q
) ≤ Pq, (4)
where Pq is power in units of energy per transmitted symbol, and the symbols are assumed to be, without
loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), zero-mean unit energy uncorrelated symbols, i.e., E
{
sq(n)s
H
q (n)
}
= I. Note
that different symbols may be drawn from different constellations.
Co.2 Spectral mask constraint, i.e.,
E
{∣∣[WHFqsq]k∣∣2} = [WHFqFHq W]kk ≤ pmaxq (k), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (5)
where pmaxq (k) represents the maximum power user q is allowed to allocate on the k-th frequency bin.
4 Constraints in (5) are imposed by radio spectrum regulations and attempt to limit the amounts of
interference generated by each transmitter over some specified frequency bands.
Co.3 Maximum tolerable (uncoded) symbol error rate (SER) on each link, i.e.,5
Pe,q(k) , Prob{sˆq(k) 6= sq(k)} ≤ P ⋆e,q, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (6)
3In practice, both estimation and feedback are inevitably affected by errors. This scenario can be studied by extending
our formulation to games with partial information [14, 15], but this goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
4Observe that if (1/N)
X
k
pmaxq (k) ≤ Pq, we obtain the trivial solution [W
H
FqF
H
q W]kk = p
max
q (k), ∀k.
5Given the symbol error probability Pe, the Bit Error Rate (BER) Pb can be approximately obtained from Pe (using
a Gray encoding to map the bits into the constellation points) as Pb = Pe/ log2(|C|), where log2(|C|) is the number of bits
per symbol, and |C| is the constellation size.
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where sˆq(k) is the k-th entry of sˆq given in (3). Another alternative approach to guarantee the required
quality of service (QoS) of the system is to impose an upper bound constraint on the global average
BER of each link, defined as (1/N)
∑N
k=1 Pe,q(k). Interestingly, in [35] it was proved that equal BER
constraints on each subchannel as given in (6), provide essentially the same performance of those
obtained imposing a global average BER constraint, as the average BER is strongly dominated by the
minimum of the BERs on the individual subchannels. Thus, for the rest of the paper we consider BER
constraints as in (6).
2.2 Problem Formulation: Optimal Transceivers Design based on Game Theory
In this section we formulate the design of the transceiver pairs (Fq,Gq)
Q
q=1 of system (2) within the
framework of game theory, using as optimality criterion the concept of NE [14]-[16]. We consider two
classes of payoff functions, as detailed next.
2.2.1 Competitive maximization of mutual information
In this section we focus on the fundamental (theoretic) limits of system (2), under A.1-A.5, and
consider the competitive maximization of information rate of each link, given constraints Co.1 and
Co.2. Using A.1, the achievable information rate for user q is computed as the maximum mutual
information between the transmitted block xq and the received block yq, assuming the other received
signals as additive (colored) noise. It is straightforward to see that a (pure or mixed strategy) NE
is obtained if each user transmits using Gaussian signaling, with a proper precoder Fq. In fact, for
each user, given that all other users use Gaussian codebooks, the codebook that maximizes mutual
information is also Gaussian [34]. Hence, given A.5, the mutual information for the q-th user is [34]
Iq(Fq,F−q) =
1
N
log
(∣∣I+ FHq HHqqR−1−qHqqFq∣∣) (7)
where R−q , σ
2
qI +
Q∑
r 6=q=1
HrqFrF
H
r H
H
rq is the interference plus noise covariance matrix, observed by
user q, and F−q , (Fr)
Q
r 6=q=1 is the set of all the precoding matrices, except the q-th one. Observe that,
for each link, we can always assume that the receiver is composed of an MMSE stage followed by some
other stage, since the MMSE is capacity-lossless. Thus, w.l.o.g., we assume in the following that6
Gq = R
−1
−qHqqFq(I+ F
H
q H
H
qqR
−1
−qHFq)
−1, ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. (8)
Hence, the strategy of each player reduces to finding the optimal precoding Fq that maximizes
Iq(Fq,F−q) in (7), under constraints Co.1 and Co.2. Stated in mathematical terms, we have the
following strategic noncooperative game
(G1) :
maximize
Fq
Iq(Fq,F−q)
subject to Fq ∈ Fq,
∀q ∈ Ω, (9)
where Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of players (i.e., the links), Iq(Fq,F−q) is the payoff function of player
q, given in (7), and Fq is the set of admissible strategies (the precoding matrices) of player q, defined
6It is straightforward to verify that the MMSE receiver in (8) is capacity-lossless by checking that, for each q, the
mutual information (for a given set of (Fq)
Q
q=1) after the equalizer Gq, log(|I + F
H
q H
H
qqGq(G
H
q R−qGq)
−1
G
H
q HqqFq|) is
equal to (7).
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as
Fq ,
{
Fq ∈ CN×N : 1
N
Tr
(
FqF
H
q
) ≤ Pq, [WHFqFHq W]kk ≤ pmaxq (k), ∀k = 1, . . . , N} . (10)
The solutions to (9) are the well-known Nash equilibria, which are formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 A (pure) strategy profile F⋆ =
(
F∗q
)
q∈Ω
∈ F1 × . . . ×FQ is a NE of game G1 if
Iq(F
⋆
q ,F
⋆
−q) ≥ Iq(Fq,F⋆−q), ∀Fq ∈ Fq, ∀q ∈ Ω. (11)
The definition of NE as given in (11) can be generalized to contain mixed strategies [14], i.e., the
possibility of choosing a randomization over a set of pure strategies (the randomizations of different
players are independent). Hence, the mixed extension of the strategic game G1 is given by G 1 ={
Ω, {F q}q∈Ω, {Iq}q∈Ω
}
, where F q denotes the set of the probability distributions over the set Fq of
pure strategies. In game G 1, the strategy profile, for each player q, is the probability density function
fFq(Fq) defined on Fq and the payoff function Iq = EfFqEfF−q {Iq} is the expectation of Iq defined
in (7) taken over the mixed strategies of all the players. A mixed strategy NE of a strategic game is
defined as a NE of its mixed extension [14].
Observe that for the payoff functions defined in (7), we can indeed limit ourselves to adopt pure
strategies w.l.o.g., as we did in (9). Too see why, consider the mixed extension G 1 of G1 in (9). For any
player q, we have
EfFqEfF−q {Iq (Fq,F−q)} ≤ EfF−q
{
Iq
(
EfFq {Fq} ,F−q
)}
, ∀F−q : fF−q (F−q) ∈ F−q, (12)
where F−q , F 1× . . .×F q−1×F q+1× . . .×FQ. The inequality in (12) follows from the concavity of
the function Iq(Fq,F−q) in FqF
H
q [33] and from Jensen’s inequality [34]. Since the equality is reached
if and only if Fq reduces to a pure strategy (because of the strict concavity of Iq(Fq,F−q) in FqF
H
q ),
whatever the strategies of the other players are, every NE of the game is achieved using pure strategies.7
2.2.2 Competitive maximization of transmission rates
The optimality criterion chosen in the previous section requires the use of ideal Gaussian codebooks
with a proper covariance matrix. In practice, Gaussian codes are substituted with simple (suboptimal)
finite order signal constellations, such as Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) or Pulse Amplitude
Modulation (PAM), and practical (yet suboptimal) coding schemes. Hence, in this section, we focus on
the more practical case where the information bits are mapped onto constellations of finite size (with
possibly different cardinality), and consider the optimization of the transceivers (Fq,Gq)q∈Ω, in order
to maximize the transmission rate on each link, under constraints Co.1 ÷ Co.3.
Given the signal model in (2), where now each vector sq , (sq(k))
N
k=1 is drawn from a set of finite-
constellations (Ck,q)Nk=1 , i.e., sq(k) ∈ Ck,q, the transmission rate of each link is simply the number of
transmitted bits per symbol, i.e.,
rq =
N∑
k=1
log2(|Ck,q|), (13)
7This result was obtained independently in [29]-[31].
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where |Ck,q| denotes the size of constellation Ck,q. The (uncoded) average error probability of the q-th
link on the k-th substream, as defined in (6), under the Gaussian assumption, can be analytically
expressed, for any given set (Fq,Gq)q∈Ω and (Ck,q)Nk=1, as
Pe,q(k) = αk,qQ
(√
βk,q SINRk,q
)
, (14)
where αk,q and βk,q are constants that depend on the signal constellation, Q (·) is the Q-function [36],
and SINRk,q is defined as
SINRk,q ,
∣∣∣[GHq HqqFq]kk∣∣∣2[
GHq RqGq
]
kk
, (15)
with Rq , HqqFqF
H
q H
H
qq − Hqqfk,qfHk,qHHqq + R−q, where fk,q denotes the k-th column of Fq, and
R−q = σ
2
qI+
Q∑
r 6=q=1
HrqFrF
H
r H
H
rq (see, e.g., [7, 8]).
According to the constraints Co.3 in (6), because of (14), the optimal linear receiver for each user
q can be computed as the matrix Gq maximizing simultaneously all the (SINRk,q)
N
k=1 in (15), while
keeping the set of precoding matrices (Fq)q∈Ω and the constellations (Ck,q)Nk=1,q∈Ωfixed. This leads to
the well-known Wiener filter for Gq, as given in (8) [7, 8, 9], and the following expression for the SINRs
in (15):
SINRk,q = SINRk,q(Fq,F−q) =
1[
(I +FHq H
H
qqR
−1
−qHqqFq)
−1
]
kk
− 1, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (16)
Under the previous setup, each player has to choose the precoder Fq and the constellations (Ck,q)Nk=1
that maximize the transmission rate in (13), under constraints Co.1 ÷ Co.3. Since, for any given rate,
the optimal combination of the constellations (Ck,q)Nk=1 would require an exhaustive search over all the
combinations that provide the desired rate, in the following we adopt, as in [9], the classical method to
choose quasi-optimal combinations, based on the gap approximation [37, 38].8 As a result, the number
of bits that can be transmitted over the N substreams from the q-th source, for a given family of
constellations and a given error probability P ⋆e,q, is approximatively given by
rq(Fq,F−q) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
log2
(
1+
SINRk,q(Fq,F−q)
Γq
)
(17)
where SINRk,q(Fq,F−q) is defined in (16), and Γq ≥ 1 is the gap which depends only on the constella-
tions and on P ⋆e,q. For M -QAM constellations, e.g., if the error probability in (14) is approximated by
Pe,q(k) ≈ 4Q
(√
(3/(M − 1)) SINRk,q
)
, the resulting gap is Γq = (Q−1(P ⋆e,q/4))2/3 [9].
In summary, the structure of the game is
(G2) :
maximize
Fq
rq(Fq,F−q)
subject to Fq ∈ Fq,
∀q ∈ Ω, (18)
where Fq and rq(Fq,F−q) are defined in (10) and (17), respectively. As in (9), in the following we focus
on pure strategies only.
8In our optimization we will use, as optimal solution, the continuous bit distribution obtained by the gap approximation,
without considering the effect on the optimality of the granularity and the bit cap. The performance loss induced by these
sources of distortion can be quantified using the approach given in [9].
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3 Optimality of the Channel-Diagonalizing Structure
We derive now the optimal set of precoding matrices (Fq)q∈Ω for both games G1 and G2, and provide a
unified reformulation of the original complicated games in a simpler equivalent form. The main result
is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 An optimal solution to the matrix-valued games G1 and G2 is
Fq =W
√
diag(pq), ∀q ∈ Ω, (19)
whereW is the IFFT matrix, and p , (pq)q∈Ω, with pq , (pq(k))
N
k=1, is the solution to the vector-valued
game G , defined as
(G ) :
maximize
pq
Rq(pq,p−q)
subject to pq ∈ Pq
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (20)
where Rq(pq,p−q) and Pq are the payoff function and the set of admissible strategies of user q, respec-
tively, defined as
Rq(pq,p−q) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
1
Γq
sinrq(k)
)
, (21)
and
Pq ,
{
pq ∈ RN : 1
N
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pq(k) ≤ pmaxq (k), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
, (22)
with pmaxq (k) , p
max
q (k)/Pq ,
sinrq(k) =
Pq
∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2 pq(k)/dγqq
σ2q +
∑
r 6=q Pr
∣∣H¯rq(k)∣∣2 pr(k)/dγrq , |Hqq(k)|
2 pq(k)
1 +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|2 pr(k)
, (23)
where Hrq(k) , H¯rq(k)
√
Pr/
(
σ2q d
γ
rq
)
, and Γq = 1 if G1 is considered.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1 − Optimality of the diagonal transmission. According to Theorem 1, a NE of both
games G1 and G2 is reached using, for each user, a diagonal transmission strategy through the channel
eigenmodes (i.e., the frequency bins), irrespective of the channel realizations, power budget, spectral
mask constraints and MUI. This result simplifies the original matrix-valued optimization problems (9)
and (18), as the number of unknowns for each user reduces from N2 (the original matrix Fq) to N (the
power allocation vector pq = (pq(k))
N
k=1, with no performance loss.
Observe that the optimality of the diagonalizing structure was well known in the single-user case,
when the optimization criterion is the maximization of mutual information and the constraint is the
average transmit power [7]-[9], [35]. However, under the additional constraint on the spectral emission
masks, the optimality of the diagonal transmission has never been proved, neither in a single-user nor
in a multi-user competitive scenario. But, most interestingly, Theorem 1 proves the optimality of the
diagonal transmission also for game G2, where each player maximizes the transmission rate, using finite
order constellations, and under constraints on the spectral emission mask, transmit power, and average
error probability. In such a case, the optimality of the channel-diagonalizing scheme was not at all
9
clear. Previous works on this subject adopted the typical approach used in single-user MIMO systems
[23]-[27]: They first imposed the diagonal transmission and then employed the gap approximation
solution over the set of parallel subchannels. However, such a combination of channel diagonalization
and gap approximation was not proved to be optimal. Conversely, Theorem 1 proves the optimality of
this approach and it subsumes, as particular cases, the results of [23]-[27], corresponding to the simple
case where there are no mask constraints.
It is also worth noticing that the optimality of the diagonalizing structure is a consequence of the
property that all channel matrices, under assumptions A.2 and A.3, are diagonalized by the same
matrix, i.e., the IFFT matrix W. There is another interesting scenario where this property holds true:
The case where all the channels are time-varying flat fading and the constraints are on the transmit
power and on the maximum power that can be emitted over some specified time intervals (this is
the dual version of the spectral mask constraint). In such a case, all channel matrices are diagonal
and then it is trivial to see that they have a common diagonalizing matrix, i.e., the identity matrix.
Applying duality arguments to Theorem 1, the optimal transmission strategy for each user is a sort
of TDMA over a frame of N time slots, where each user optimizes the power allocation across the N
time slots (possibly sharing time slots with the other users). Clearly, as opposed to the case considered
in Theorem 1, in the time-selective case, the transmitter needs to have a non-causal knowledge of the
channel variation. In practice, this kind of knowledge would require some sort of channel prediction.
According to Theorem 1, instead of considering the matrix-valued games G1 and G2, we may focus
on the simpler vector game G , with no performance loss. It is straightforward to see that a NE of both
matrix-valued games exists if the solution set of G is non empty. Moreover, the Nash equilibria of G ,
if they exist, must satisfy the waterfilling solution for each user, i.e., the following system of nonlinear
equations:
p⋆q = WFq
(
p⋆1, . . . ,p
⋆
q−1,p
⋆
q+1, . . . ,p
⋆
Q
)
= WFq(p
⋆
−q) , ∀q ∈ Ω, (24)
with the waterfilling operator WFq (·) defined as
[WFq (p−q)]k ,
[
µq − Γq
1 +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|2 pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|2
]pmaxq (k)
0
, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (25)
where [x]ba denotes the Euclidean projection of x onto the interval [a, b]
9 and the water-level µq is chosen
to satisfy the power constraint (1/N)
∑N
k=1 p
⋆
q(k) = 1.
Given the nonlinear system of equations (24), the fundamental questions are: i) Does a solution
exist? ii) If a solution exists, is it unique? iii) How can such a solution be reached in a distributed way?
The answer to the first two questions is given in the forthcoming sections, whereas the study of
distributed algorithms is addressed in Part II of this paper [32].
4 Existence and Uniqueness of NE
Before providing the conditions for the uniqueness of the NE of game G , we introduce the following
intermediate definitions. Given game G , define H(k) ∈ RQ×Q as
9The Euclidean projection [x]b
a
is defined as follows: [x]b
a
= a, if x ≤ a, [x]b
a
= x, if a < x < b, and [x]b
a
= b, if x ≥ b.
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[H(k)]qr ,
 Γq
|H¯rq(k)|2
|H¯qq(k)|2
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
, if k ∈ Dq ∩ Dr and r 6= q,
0, otherwise,
(26)
where Dq denotes the set {1, . . . , N} (possibly) deprived of the carrier indices that user q would never
use as the best response set to any strategy used by the other users, for the given set of transmit power
and propagation channels:
Dq ,
{
k ∈ {1, . . . , N} : ∃ p−q ∈ P−q such that [WFq (p−q)]k 6= 0
}
, (27)
with WFq (·) defined in (25) and P−q , P1 × · · · ×Pq−1 ×Pq+1 × · · · ×PQ.
The study of game G is addressed in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Game G admits a nonempty solution set for any set of channels, spectral mask constraints
and transmit power of the users. Furthermore, the NE is unique if
ρ (H(k)) < 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (C1)
where H(k) is defined in (26) and ρ (H(k)) denotes the spectral radius10 of H(k).
Proof. See Appendix B.
We provide now alternative sufficient conditions for Theorem 2. To this end, we first introduce the
matrix Hmax ∈ RQ×Q, defined as
[Hmax]qr ,
 Γq maxk∈Dq∩Dr
|H¯rq(k)|2
|H¯qq(k)|2
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise,
(28)
with the convention that the maximum in (28) is zero if Dq ∩Dr is empty. Then, we have the following
corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 A sufficient condition for (C1) is:
ρ (Hmax) < 1, (C2)
where Hmax is defined in (28).
To give additional insight into the physical interpretation of the conditions for the uniqueness of
the NE, we introduce the following corollary.
Corollary 2 A sufficient condition for (C1) is given by one of the two following set of conditions:
Γq
wq
∑
r=1,r 6=q
wr [H(k)]qr < 1, ∀q ∈ Ω, and ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (C3)
1
wr
∑
q=1,q 6=r
Γq wq [H(k)]rq < 1, ∀r ∈ Ω, and ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (C4)
where w , [w1, . . . , wQ]
T is any positive vector and H(k) is defined in (26).
10The spectral radius ρ (A) of the matrix A is defined as ρ (A) , max{|λ| : λ ∈ σ(A)}, with σ(A) denoting the
spectrum of A [50].
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Note that, as a by-product of the proof of Theorem 2, one can always choose Dq = {1, . . . , N} in
(C1)-(C4), i.e., without excluding any subcarrier. However, less stringent conditions are obtained by
removing the unnecessary carriers, i.e., those carriers that, for a given power budget and interference
levels, are never going to be used.
Remark 2 − Physical interpretation of uniqueness conditions. As expected, the uniqueness of
NE is ensured if the links are sufficiently far apart from each other. In fact, from (C3)-(C4) for example,
one infers that there exists a minimum distance beyond which the uniqueness of NE is guaranteed,
corresponding to the maximum level of interference that may be tolerated by the users. Specifically,
condition (C3) imposes a constraint on the maximum amount of interference that each receiver can
tolerate; whereas (C4) introduces an upper bound on the maximum level of interference that each
transmitter is allowed to generate. This result agrees with the fact that, as the MUI becomes negligible,
the rates Rq in (21) become decoupled and then the rate-maximization problem in (20) for each user
admits a unique solution. But, the most interesting result coming from conditions (C1)-(C4) is that
the uniqueness of the equilibrium is robust against the worst normalized channels |Hrq(k)|2/ |Hqq(k)|2;
in fact, the subchannels corresponding to the highest ratios |Hrq(k)|2/|Hqq(k)|2 (and, in particular, the
subchannels where |Hqq(k)|2 is vanishing) do not necessarily affect the uniqueness condition, as their
carrier indices may not belong to the set Dq.
Remark 3 − Uniqueness condition and distributed algorithms. Interestingly, condition (C2),
in addition to guarantee the uniqueness of the NE, is also responsible for the convergence of both
simultaneous and sequential iterative waterfilling algorithms, proposed in Part II of the paper [32].
Remark 4 − Comparison with previous conditions. Theorem 2 unifies and generalizes many
existence and uniqueness results obtained in the literature [23]-[27], [29] for the special cases of game G
in (20). Specifically, in [23]-[27] a game as in (20) is studied, where all the players are assumed to have
the same power budget and no spectral mask constraints are considered [i.e., pmaxq (k) = +∞,∀k, q]. In
[29] instead, the channel is assumed to be flat over the whole bandwidth. Interestingly, the conditions
obtained in [23]-[27], [29] are more restrictive than (C1)-(C4), as shown in the following corollary of
Theorem 2.11
Corollary 3 Sufficient conditions for (C3) are [23, 24, 27]
Γq max
k∈{1,...,N}
{ |H¯rq(k)|2
|H¯qq(k)|2
}
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
<
1
Q− 1 , ∀ r, q 6= r ∈ Ω, (C5)
or [25]
Γq max
k∈{1,...,N}
{ |H¯rq(k)|2
|H¯qq(k)|2
}
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
<
1
2Q− 3 , ∀ r, q 6= r ∈ Ω. (C6)
In the case of flat-fading channels (i.e., H¯rq(k) = H¯rq, ∀r, q), condition (C3) becomes [29]
Γq
Q∑
r=1,r 6=q
|H¯rq|2
|H¯qq|2
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
< 1, ∀q ∈ Ω. (29)
11We summarize the main results of [23]-[27] using our notation to facilitate the comparison.
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Figure 1: Probability of (C1), (C5) and (C7) versus drq/dqq; Q = 5 [subplot (a)], Q = 15 [subplot (b)], γ = 2.5,
Γq = 1, drq/dqq = dqr/drr, ∀r, q ∈ Ω, N = 64.
Recently, alternative sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the NE of game G were given in
[28].12 Among all, an easy condition to be checked is the following:
I+H(k) is positive definite for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (C7)
where H(k) is defined as in (26), with each Dq = {1, . . . , N}.
All the conditions above depend on the channel realizations
{
H¯rq(k)
}
and on the network topology
through the distances {drq} . Hence, there is a nonzero probability that they are not satisfied for a given
set of channel realizations, drawn from a given probability space. In order to compare the goodness
of the above conditions, we tested them over a set of channel impulse responses generated as vectors
composed of i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. We plot
in Figure 1 the probability that conditions (C1), (C5) and (C7) are satisfied versus the ratio drq/dqq,
i.e., the normalized interlink distance. For the sake of simplicity, we assumed drq = dqr, Pq = Pr and
Γq = 1, ∀q, r ∈ Ω. We considered Q = 5 [Figure 1(a)] and Q = 15 [Figure 1(b)] active links. We tested
our condition considering in (C1) a set Dq obtained using the following worst case scenario. For each
user q, we build the worst possible interferer as the virtual node (denoted by v) that has a power budget
equal to the sum of the transmit powers of all the other users (i.e.,
∑
r 6=q Pr) and channel between its
own transmitter and receiver q as the highest channel among all the interference channels with respect
to receiver q, i.e., |Hvq(k)|2 = maxr 6=q |Hrq(k)|2. We build a set that includes the set Dq defined in (27)
using the following iterative procedure: For each subcarrier k, the virtual user distributes its own power
(
∑
r 6=q Pr) across the whole spectrum in order to facilitate user q to use the subcarrier k, as much as
possible. If, even under these circumstances, user q is not going to use subcarrier k, because of its own
power budget Pq and |Hqq(k)|2, then we are sure that index k can not possibly belong to Dq.
We can see, from Figure 1, that the probability that the NE is unique increases as the links become
more and more separated of each other (i.e., the ratio drq/dqq increases). Furthermore, we can verify
that, even having not considered the smallest possible set Dq, as defined in (27), our condition (C1)
has a much higher probability of being satisfied than (C5) and (C7). The main difference between
our condition (C1) and (C5), (C7) is that (C1) exhibits a neat threshold behavior since it transits
12We thank Prof. Facchinei, who kindly brought to our attention reference [28], after this paper was completed.
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very rapidly from the non-uniqueness guarantee to the almost certain uniqueness, as the inter-user
distance ratio drq/dqq increases by a small amount. This shows that the uniqueness condition (C1)
depends, ultimately, on the interlink distance rather than on the channel realization. This represents
the fundamental difference between our uniqueness condition and those given in the literature. As an
example, for a system with Q = 5 links and probability 0.99 of guaranteeing the uniqueness of the
NE, condition (C1) requires drq/dqq ≃ 2 whereas conditions (C5) and (C7) require drq/dqq > 40 and
drq/dqq ≃ 24, respectively. Furthermore, this difference increases as the number Q of links increases.
5 Physical Interpretation of NE
In this section we provide a physical interpretation of the optimal power allocation corresponding
to the NE in the limiting cases of low and high MUI.13 To quantify what low and high interference
mean, we introduce the SNR of link q (denoted by snrq) and the Interference-to-Noise Ratio due to the
interference received by destination q and generated by source r, with r 6= q (denoted by inrrq), defined
as snrq , Pq/(σ
2
qd
α
qq) and inrrq , Pr/(σ
2
qd
α
rq). Using snrq and inrrq, the SINR sinrq(k) in (23) can be
rewritten as
sinrq(k) =
snrq
∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2 pq(k)
1 +
∑
r 6=q inrrq
∣∣H¯rq(k)∣∣2 pr(k) . (30)
Low interference case. Consider the low interference case, i.e., the situation where the interference
term in the denominator in (30) can be neglected. A sufficient condition to satisfy this assumption is
that the links are sufficiently far apart from each other, i.e., drq >> dqq ∀r 6= q,r, q ∈ Ω. For sufficiently
small inrrq and sufficiently large snrq, condition (C1) is satisfied and, hence, by Theorem 1, the NE is
unique. Also, by inspection of the waterfilling solution in (24), it is clear that under those conditions,
pq(k) > 0 for all q ∈ Ω and k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. This means that each source uses the whole bandwidth.
Furthermore, it is well known that as the SNR increases, the waterfilling solution tends to a flat power
allocation. In summary, we have the following result.
Proposition 1 Given game G , there exist sets of values {inr⋆rq}r 6=q∈Ω and {snr⋆q}q∈Ω, with inr⋆rq << 1
and snr⋆q >> 1, such that, for all inrrq ≤ inr⋆rq and snrq ≥ snr⋆q, the NE of G is unique (cf. Theorem 2)
and all users share the whole available bandwidth. In addition, if snrq >> snr
⋆
q , then the optimal power
allocation of each user tends to be flat over the whole bandwidth.
From Proposition 1, it turns out, as it could have been intuitively guessed, that when the interference
is low, at the (unique) NE, every user transmits over the entire available spectrum (like a CDMA
system), as in such a case nulling the interference would not be worth of the bandwidth reduction.
As a numerical example, in Figure 2, we plot the optimal power spectral density (PSD) of a system
composed of three links, for different values of the ratio drq/dqq. The results shown in Figure 2 have
been obtained using the distributed algorithms described in Part II [32]. From Figure 2, we can check
that, as the ratio drq/dqq increases, the optimal PSD tends to be flat, while satisfying the simultaneous
waterfilling condition in (24).
13For the sake of notation, in this section we consider only the case in which pmaxq (k) = +∞, ∀q,∀k, but it is straight-
forward to see that our derivations can be easily generalized to the case of spectral mask constraints.
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High interference case. When inrrq >> 1 for all q and r 6= q, the interference is the dominant
contribution in the equivalent noise (thermal noise plus MUI) in the denominator of (30). In this case,
game G admits multiple Nash equilibria. An interesting class of these equilibria includes the FDMA
solutions (called orthogonal Nash equilibria), occurring when the power spectra of different users are
nonoverlapping. The characterization of these equilibria is given in the following.
Proposition 2 Given game G , for each q ∈ Ω, let Iq , {k ∈ {1, . . . , N} : pq(k) > 0, pr(k) = 0, ∀r
6= q ∈ Ω} denote the set of subcarriers over which only user q transmits. For any given {snrq}q∈Ω,
there exists {inr⋆rq}r 6=q∈Ω, with each inr⋆rq >> 1, such that for all inrrq ≥ inr⋆rq, game G admits multiple
orthogonal Nash equilibria. If, in addition, {snrq}q∈Ω and {inrrq}r 6=q∈Ω are such that
Γq
∣∣H¯qr(k)∣∣2∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2 inrqrsnrq ≤ 1, k ∈ Iq, r 6= q ∈ Ω, (31)
and an orthogonal NE still exists, the subcarriers are allocated among the users according to∣∣H¯rr(kr)∣∣2∣∣H¯qq(kr)∣∣2 ≥
∣∣H¯rr(kq)∣∣2∣∣H¯qq(kq)∣∣2 , kr ∈ Ir and kq ∈ Iq. (32)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The above proposition has an intuitive interpretation: When the interference is very high, the users
self-organize themselves in order to remove the interference totally, i.e., using nonoverlapping bands.
In this case, game G may have multiple orthogonal Nash equilibria. For example, in the simple case of
Q = N, there are Q! different orthogonal Nash equilibria, corresponding to all the permutations where
each transmitter uses only one carrier. As the interference level decreases (i.e., the inrrq’s), the NE
becomes unique and in such a case, if an orthogonal equilibrium still exists, then the distribution of the
subcarriers among the users must satisfy the rule given by (32). This strategy is similar, in principle
to FDMA, but differently from standard FDMA, here each user is getting the “best” portion of the
spectrum for itself. Interestingly, (32) is the generalization of the condition satisfied by the subcarrier
allocation in the multiple access frequency-selective channel, where the optimization problem is the
sum-rate maximization under a transmit power constraint [39]. In Figure 2(b), we show a numerical
example of the optimal power allocation at NE, for a system with two active links, in the case of high
interference. From Figure 2(b) we observe that, as predicted by Proposition 2, different users tend to
transmit over non-overlapping bands.
In general, with intermediate interference levels, the optimal solution consists in allowing partial
superposition of the PSDs of the users. An example of optimal PSD distribution for an intermediate
level of interference is plotted in Figure 2(a) (see the curves obtained with drq/dqq = 5).
6 How good is a Nash Equilibrium ?
The optimality criterion used in this paper, based on the achievement of a NE, is useful to derive
decentralized strategies. However, as the Nash equilibria need not to be Pareto-efficient [40], this
criterion, in general, does not provide any a priori guarantee about the goodness of the equilibrium.
Even when the equilibrium is unique, it is important to know how far is the performance from the
optimal solution provided by a centralized strategy [12, 26]. The scope of this section is thus to
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Figure 2: Optimal PSDs at NE in the low-interference and high-interference cases: a) Solid, dashed, and dashed-dot
line curves refer on the PSD obtained for drq/dqq = 5, 8,12, respectively, and snrq = 15 dB; b) Solid and dashed lines refer
to PSD of each link and PSD of the MUI plus thermal noise, normalized by the channel transfer function square modulus
of the link, respectively; d12/d22 = d21/d11 = 1,Γ1 = Γ2 = 1, snr1 = snr2 = 5 dB.
quantify the performance loss resulting from the use of a decentralized approach, with respect to the
optimal centralized solution. To this end, we compare the rates of the users corresponding to the Nash
equilibria of game G in (20) with the rates lying on the boundary of the largest region of the achievable
rates obtained as the Pareto-optimal trade-off surface solving the multi-objective optimization based
on (21).
The rate region is defined as the set R of all feasible data rate combinations r , [r1, . . . , rQ]T ∈ RQ+
among the active links. A given vector of rates r ∈ RQ+ is said to be feasible if it is possible to transfer
information in the network at these rates, reliably, for some power allocation p , (pq)q∈Ω satisfying
the power constraints pq ∈ Pq, ∀q ∈ Ω. The rate region can be numerically computed by considering
all possible power allocations p such that pq ∈ Pq, ∀q ∈ Ω. Specifically, we have
R =
⋃
pq∈Pq , q∈Ω
{
r ∈ RQ+ | rq ≤ Rq(p),∀q ∈ Ω
}
=
{
r ∈ RQ+ | ∃ p : pq ∈ Pq, rq ≤ Rq(p), ∀q ∈ Ω
}
(33)
where Rq(p) and Pq are given in (21) and (22), respectively.
In general, the characterization of the rate region is a very difficult nonconvex optimization problem.
Nevertheless, in the case of low interference, we have the following.
Proposition 3 In the case of low interference (inrrq << 1), and high SNR (snrq >> 1), the rate region
R given in (33) is a convex set.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The best achievable trade-off among the rates is given by the Pareto optimal points of the set R
given in (33). In formulas, all highest feasible rates can be found by solving the following multi-objective
optimization problem (MOP) [11]:
maximize
p
{R1(p), . . . , RQ(p)}
subject to pq ∈ Pq, ∀q ∈ Ω.
(34)
Practical algorithms to solve the MOP in (34) can be obtained, using the approach proposed, e.g.,
in [13, 42]. The Pareto optimal solutions to the MOP can also be obtained by solving the following
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ordinary scalar optimization:
maximize
p
Q∑
q=1
λqRq(p)
subject to pq ∈ Pq, ∀q ∈ Ω.
(35)
where λ is a set of positive weights. For any given λ > 0, the (globally) optimal solution to (35) is a
point on the trade-off surface of MOP (34) (cf. Appendix E). However, as the rate region (21) is in
principle nonconvex, by varying λ > 0, only a portion of the trade-off curve of (34) can be explored.
Specifically, all the Pareto optimal points lying on the nonconvex part of the rate region cannot be
obtained as solutions to (35). We will refer to (35) as the scalarized MOP.
Comparing (20) with (34), we infer that, in general, the Nash equilibria are not solutions to (34),
and thus they are not Pareto-efficient. An interesting question is whether one can modify the payoff
function of every player so that some Nash equilibria of the modified game coincide with the Pareto
optimal solutions. The answer is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let G˜ (λ) be the game defined as
G˜ (λ) =
{
Ω, {Pq}q∈Ω , {Φ˜q}q∈Ω
}
, (36)
where the payoff functions are
Φ˜q(p) = Rq(p) +
1
λq
∑
r 6=q
λrRr(p) (37)
with Rq(p) defined in (21) and λ , [λ1, . . . , λQ]
T is a set of positive weights. Then, for any given
λ > 0, the solution set of G˜ (λ) is not empty and contains the (globally) optimal solution to the
scalarized MOP (35), which is the Pareto optimal solution to the MOP (34) corresponding to the point
where the hyperplane with normal vector λ is tangent to the boundary of the rate region (33).
Moreover, if the conditions of Proposition 3 are satisfied, then:
1. G˜ (λ) admits a unique NE, for any given λ > 0, and
2. Any14 Pareto optimal solution to the MOP (34) can be obtained as the unique NE of G˜ (λ), with
a proper choice of λ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Comparing (21) with (37), an interesting interpretation arises: The Pareto-optimal solutions to
the MOP (34) can be achieved as a NE of the modified game where each player incorporates, in
its utility function, a linear combination, through positive coefficient, of the utilities of the other
players.15 The NE of the modified game G˜ (λ) in (36) can be obtained, for any given λ, using, e.g.,
the gradient projection based iterative algorithm, proposed in [16]. However, this algorithm requires
coordination among the players, since, at each iteration, each user has to know the channels and the
strategies adopted by all the other users. Thus, Pareto-efficiency can be achieved only at the price
14We do not consider the rate profiles where the rate of some user is zero, w.l.o.g.. The corner points of the rate region
can be achieved solving a lower dimensional problem.
15An alternative approach to move toward Pareto optimality is to allow that the game could be played more than once,
i.e., to consider the so called repeated games [14], with a proper punishment strategy [41]. This study goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
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of a significant increase of signalling and coordination among the users and this goes against our
search for distributed, independent, coding/decoding among the users. Note that the structure of (37)
generalizes the pricing techniques widely used in the game theory field to obtain a Pareto improvement
of the system performance with respect to the Nash equilibria of a noncooperative game (see, e.g., [43]
and references therein).
Using Proposition 4, we can now characterize and quantify the Nash equilibria of the game G given
in (20) by providing upper and lower bounds.
Proposition 5 All the Nash equilibria p⋆ of game G in (20) satisfy the following inequality
max
pq∈Pq
min
p−q∈P−q
Rq(pq,p−q) ≤ Rq(p⋆q ,p⋆−q) ≤ Φ˜⋆q, ∀q ∈ Ω, (38)
where Φ˜⋆q is a NE of G˜ (λ) defined in (36) with a proper choice of λ.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Thus, at any NE of game G in (20), the rate of each user is always better than that obtained by
optimizing the worst case (which in general is too pessimistic). However, in general, the Nash equilibria
of G may be Pareto dominated. We quantify numerically this loss in the next section.
7 Numerical Results
It is interesting to compare the Nash equilibria of game G with the rates lying on the boundary of the
rate region, in order to quantify the loss of Nash equilibria with respect to the Pareto optimal solutions.
To this end, we consider the following two different topologies. In the first example, we assume that the
system operates in a symmetric situation, whereas in the second example we consider an asymmetric
scenario.
Example 1: Symmetric Case. In this scenario, the system is assumed to be symmetric, i.e., the
transmitters have the same power budget and the interference links are at the same distance (i.e.,
drq = dqr, ∀q, r), so that the cross channel gains are comparable in average sense. In Figure 3, we plot
the Pareto optimal points of (34) and the Nash equilibria of game G defined in (20), for a two-users
symmetric system. The two axes represent the rates, in bits/symbol, for the two links. The two pairs
of nodes are placed at different distances, to test situations with different level of interference. In the
picture, we plot: i) the Pareto-optimal boundary (33), referred to as RMOP (solid lines); ii) the NE
points (∗) of game G , given in (20); iii) the NE points of the modified game G˜ (λ), given in (36), for
different values of the vector λ (squares); and iv) the rate region (referred as RNE) corresponding to
the Nash equilibria achieved by varying the transmit power of each link, under the constraint that the
overall transmit power is fixed (dashed lines).16 All the Nash equilibria of game G are reached using
the algorithms introduced in Part II of this paper [32], whereas the Nash equilibria of game G˜ (λ) are
reached using the gradient projection algorithm, proposed in [16]. From Figure 3, we infer that the Nash
equilibria approach the optimal Pareto curve as the interference level decreases (i.e., the ratio drq/dqq
16Note that the comparison between dashed and solid lines is not totally fair because all the rates on the boundary
of RMOP are achieved with the same power constraint Pq for each transmitter, whereas the NEs reported in the dashed
lines are obtained assuming only a total power constraint.
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increases) at least in the two user case. This is not surprising as, in the case in which the interference
is sufficiently low, the interaction (interference) among users becomes negligible and the performance is
limited by noise only, not by the interference. On the contrary, at small interpair distances (i.e., small
ratios drq/dqq), interference becomes the dominant performance limiting factor and the loss resulting
from using the decentralized approach becomes progressively larger. But the most interesting result
is that this loss is limited also in the case where the links are rather close to each other (we have
observed this result for several independent symmetric channel realizations). This suggests that, for
symmetric systems, the decentralized approach, based on a game-theoretic formulation, is indeed a
viable choice, considering its greater simplicity with respect to the centralized optimal solution. From
Figure 3, we also see that the solutions to the MOP can be alternatively reached as Nash equilibria of
the modified game G˜ in (36) (Proposition 4), using the gradient projection algorithm of [16]. However,
this algorithm cannot be implemented in a distributed way, as it requires the knowledge from each user
of the channels and the power allocations of all the other links.
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Figure 3: Rate region achieved for d12/d22 = d12/d22 = 2, 3, 5, d11 = d22 = 1, P1 = P2, snr1 = snr2 = 10 dB. Solid line,
dashed line curves and asterisks refer on rate region given in (33), rate region obtained by NEs of eG (λ) given in (36), and
NE points of game G given in (20), respectively.
Example 2: Asymmetric Case. We consider now a two-users system operating in an asymmetric
situation, where one link receives a large interference whereas the other does not. This asymmetry can
be due to many reasons, such as different transmission powers and/or unbalanced cross gains among
the users (i.e., d12 << d21 or d12 >> d21). For the sake of brevity, in the following we consider only
the latter case, i.e., the situation in which both transmitters have the same power budget but, because
of the location of transmitters and receivers, one link receives much more interference than the other.
In Figure 4(a) we plot the Pareto optimal points of (34) and the Nash equilibria of game G defined in
(20), for a two-users asymmetric system, for different values of the ratio d12/d21 and a given channel
realization. Low values of d12/d21 correspond to high asymmetric situations. From the figure we infer
that as the asymmetry of the system increases (i.e., d12/d21 decreases) the loss of Nash equilibria with
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Figure 4: a) Rate region achieved in the asymmetric case, for d12/d21 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, d11 = d22 = 1, P1 = P2,
snr1 = snr2 = 5 dB. Solid line and dashed line curves refer on rate region given in (33) and rate region obtained by NEs
of G given in (20), respectively; b) Rate region achieved for L = 0, 4, 8, N = 64, d12/d22 = d21/d11 = 1, d11 = d22 = 1,
P1 = P2, snr1 = snr2 = 5 dB.
respect to the corresponding Pareto optimal points becomes more significant. As an example, for the
setup considered in the figure, the performance loss in terms of sum-rate can be as large as 30% of
the globally optimal solution. The same qualitative behavior has been observed changing the channel
realizations and the number of users.
Example 3: Rate region versus channel order. Finally, we study the effect of channel frequency
selectivity on the Nash equilibria of game G in (20). To this end, we plot in Figure 4(b) the average
rate region obtained by the Nash equilibria of G for different values of the channel order Lh. The channel
taps are simulated as i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance 1/(Lh + 1). From
the figure, we infer that the performance of decentralized system improves with the channel order. This
is due to the fact that larger frequency fluctuations of the channel provide more degrees of freedom for
each user to find out the best spectral partition for itself, given its own channel and interference.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we formulated the problem of finding the optimal precoding/multiplexing strategy in
an infrastructureless multiuser scenario as a noncooperative game. We first considered the theoretical
problem of maximizing mutual information on each link, given constraints on the spectral mask and
transmit power. Then, to accommodate practical implementation aspects, we focused on the compet-
itive maximization of the transmission rate on each link, using finite order constellations, under the
same constraints as above plus a constraint on the average error probability. We proved that in both
cases a NE always exists and the optimal precoding/multiplexing strategy leads to a (pure strategy)
diagonal transmission for all the users. This result strongly simplifies the optimization, as we can
reduce both original complicated matrix-valued games to a simpler unified vector power control game.
Thus, we studied such a game, and derived sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the NE, that
were proved to have a broader validity than the conditions known in the literature for special cases of
our game. Then, we compared the totally decentralized strategy with the Pareto-optimal centralized
solution and we observed that the decentralized strategy has rather low performance loss with respect
to the Pareto-optimal solution, especially for symmetric systems. Larger losses were observed in the
case of very asymmetric systems. In the effort to approach the Pareto-optimal performance, we then
20
showed how to modify the payoff of each user in order to create a modified game, whose Nash equilibria
are Pareto-optimal. However, this comes at the cost of extra signaling among the users and breaks the
noncooperative feature of the original games.
Once proved that a Nash equilibrium exists and under which conditions is unique, the problem boils
down to how to reach such an equilibrium. This problem is addressed in Part II of this paper [32],
where we provide a variety of distributed algorithms along with their convergence conditions.
A Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove Theorem 1 for game G1. Then, we show that the same result holds true also for game
G2.
A.1 Game G1
Given G1 in (9), according to the definition of NE (cf. Definition 1), the proof consists in showing that
for each player q, given the optimal strategy profiles of the others at some NE (corresponding to the
optimal matrices Fr = WΣ
1/2
r , with Σr , diag(pr), ∀r 6= q) i.e., R−q = σ2qI +
∑
r 6=q
HrqWΣrW
HHHrq,
the maximum of mutual information Iq(Fq,F−q) defined in (7), under constraints (10), is achieved by
FqF
H
q =WΣqW
H , where Σq , diag(pq) and pq is solution to (20), for fixed p−q.
In the absence of spectral mask constraints, the statement of the theorem comes directly from
the well-known diagonality result of the capacity-achieving solution to the single user vector Gaussian
channel [34], and the fact that all channel matrices in (7) are diagonalized by the IFFT matrix W:
log
(∣∣I+FHq HHqqR−1−qHqqFq∣∣) = log (|I+ΛqQq|) ≤∑
k
log
(
1 + [Λq]kk [Qq]kk
)
, (39)
where Qq ,W
HFqF
H
q W, we have used the eigen-decomposition H
H
qqR
−1
−qHqq =WΛqW
H , with
[Λq]kk =
|Hqq(k)|2
1 +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|2 pr(k)
, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (40)
and the last inequality follows from the Hadamard’s inequality [34]. Since the equality in (39) is reached
if and only if Qq is diagonal and the power constraint Tr
(
FqF
H
q
)
= Tr (Qq) ≤ PT depends only on the
diagonal elements of Qq, we may set Qq diagonal w.l.o.g., i.e., Qq = Σq; which leads to the desired
optimal structure for Fq.
Interestingly, in the presence of spectral mask constraints, we can still use the previous result since
the additional constraints
[
WHFqF
H
q W
]
kk
= [Qq]kk ≤ pmaxq (k) depend only on the diagonal elements
of Qq. Introducing the optimal structure Fq =WΣ
1/2
q in G1, we obtain the simpler game G in (20).
A.2 Game G2
The proof hinges on majorization theory for which the reader is referred to [44] or [8, 45]. The key
definitions and results on which the proof is based are outlined next for convenience.
Definition 2 ([44, 1.A.1]) For any two vectors x,y ∈ Rn, we say x is majorized by y or y majorizes
x (denoted by x ≺ y or y ≻ x) if
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i∑
k=1
x[k] ≤
i∑
k=1
y[k], 1 ≤ k < n,
n∑
k=1
x[k] =
n∑
k=1
y[k],
where x[k] and y[k] denote the elements of x and y, respectively, in decreasing order.
Definition 3 A real valued function φ defined on a set A ⊆ Rn is said to be Schur-convex on A if
x ≺ y on A ⇒ φ(x) ≤ φ(y). (41)
Similarly, φ is said to be Schur-concave on A if
x ≺ y on A ⇒ φ(x) ≥ φ(y). (42)
Lemma 1 ([44, p.7], [44, 9.B.1]) For a Hermitian matrix A and a unitary matrix U, it follows that
1(A) ≺ d(UHAU) ≺ λ(A), (43)
where d(A) and λ(A) denote the diagonal elements and eigenvalues of A, respectively, and 1 denotes
the vector with identical components equal to the average of the diagonal elements of A.
Interestingly, matrix U in (43) can always be chosen such that the diagonal elements are equal to
one extreme or the other. To achieve d(UHAU) = 1(A), U has to be chosen such that UHAU has
equal diagonal elements; to achieve d(UHAU) = λ(A), U has to be chosen to diagonalize matrix A,
i.e., equal to the eigenvectors of A.
As in Appendix A.1, the proof consists in showing that, given the optimal strategy profiles of the
others at some NE, the optimal precoding matrix of user q, solution to (18), is in the form of (19).
Thus, hereafter we can focus on a generic user q, and assume that the strategy profiles of the others
are fixed and equal to Fr =WΣ
1/2
r , with Σr , diag(pr), ∀r 6= q. We prove the theorem in two steps.
Given q, first, we show the equivalence of the original complicated problem (18) and a simpler problem,
and then, we solve the simple problem, implying the optimality of Fq in the form (19).
Defining Pq ,W
HFq, the MSE matrix of user q can be written as
Eq(Pq) , (I+ F
H
q H
H
qqR
−1
q HqqFq)
−1 = (I+ FHq WΛqW
HFq)
−1 = (I+PHq ΛqPq)
−1, (44)
where in the second equality we used R−q = σ
2
qI+
∑
r 6=q
HrqWΣrW
HHHrq and the eigen-decomposition
HHqqR
−1
−qHqq =WΛqW
H , with Λq defined in (40). The matrix Eq(Pq) has the following properties: i)
Eq(Pq) is a continuous function
17 of Pq ∈ CN×N ; ii) For any unitary matrix U, Eq(Pq) satisfies
Eq(PqU) = U
HEq(Pq)U. (45)
Using (44), the payoff function of user q (to be minimized) in (18) can be written as a function of
d(Eq(Pq)):
fq(d(Eq(Pq))) , − rq(Fq) = −
1
N
N∑
k=1
log2
1+
([
Eq(Pq)
]
kk
)−1
− 1
Γq
 , (46)
17This result can be proved using [46, Theorem 10.7.1].
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where rq(Fq) is defined in (17) and the last equality follows from the relation SINRk,q(Fq) =
([
Eq(Pq)
]
kk
)−1
−1, with SINRk,q(Fq) defined in (16). The function fq has the following properties: i) fq(d(Eq(Pq)))
is a continuous function of Pq ∈ CN×N (implied from the continuity of Eq(Pq), as pointed out before);
ii) fq(d(Eq(Pq))) is a Schur-concave function on R
N
+ (cf. Definition 3) [9].
Using (44) and (46), the optimization problem of user q in (18) becomes
minimize
Pq
fq(d(Eq(Pq)))
subject to
1
N
Tr
(
PqP
H
q
) ≤ Pq,
d
(
PqP
H
q
) ≤ pmaxq ,
(P1)
where pmaxq , (p
max
q (k))
N
k=1. Observe that problem P1 always admits a solution, since the feasible set is
closed and bounded (thus compact) and the objective function is continuous in its interior (as pointed
out before). A priori the solution is unknown, but we assume it given by an oracle and denoted by18
P⋆q . As it will be shown next, we do not need to know explicitly such a solution to complete the proof
of the theorem. Then, problem P1 is equivalent to
minimize
Pq
fq(d(Eq(Pq)))
subject to d
(
PqP
H
q
)
= d⋆q,
(P2)
where d⋆q , d
(
P⋆qP
⋆H
q
)
. The equivalence of both problems is in the following sense: 1) The optimal
(and thus feasible) point P⋆q of P1 is feasible in P2 with the same value of the objective function; 2) A
feasible point in P2 (not necessarily optimal) is feasible also in P1 with the same value of the objective
function.
Thus, for any given d⋆q, we can focus on solving problem P2 w.l.o.g., and show that the op-
timal solution to P2 is diagonal; which leads to the desired structure for the original matrix Fq
in (18). Since fq (d (Eq(Pq))) is Schur-concave, it follows from Definition 3 and Lemma 1 that
fq (d (Eq(Pq))) ≥ fq (λ (Eq(Pq))) . Interestingly, for any given Pq, it is always possible to achieve
the lower bound fq (λ (Eq(Pq))) of fq (d (Eq(Pq))) by using instead the matrix P˜q = PqU such that
Eq(P˜q) = U
HEq(Pq)U is diagonal (see (45)), without affecting the constraints, since d(P˜qP˜
H
q ) =
d
(
PqP
H
q
)
. In such a case, fq(d(Eq(P˜q))) = fq(λ(Eq(P˜q))) = fq (d (Eq(Pq))) . This implies that there
is an optimal Pq for problem P2 such that Eq(Pq) is diagonal or, equivalently from (44), such that
PHq ΛqPq is diagonal.
Now, given that PHq ΛqPq is a diagonal matrix, let us say Σq, i.e., P
H
q ΛqPq = Σq, we can write
Pq as Pq = Λ
−1/2
q UqΣ
1/2
q w.l.o.g. (see, e.g., [8, 45]), where Uq is any unitary matrix. Using such a
structure of Pq, problem P1 can be equivalently written as
minimize
Σq,Uq
−
N∑
k=1
log2
(
1+
[Σq]kk
Γq
)
subject to d
(
UqΣqU
H
q
)
= d
⋆
q,
(47)
where d
⋆
q , Λqd
⋆.
From majorization theory (see [44, 5.A.9.A and 9.B.2] or [45, Lemma 4 and Lemma 3]) we know
that, for any given Σq, we can always find a unitary matrix Uq satisfying the constraint in (47) if and
only if
18In the case of multiple solutions, we may choose one of them, w.l.o.g..
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λ(Σq) ≻ d⋆q. (48)
Therefore, we can first find the optimal Σq in (47) replacing the original constraint with (48) and then
choose the matrix Uq to satisfy the constraint in (47) with that optimal Σq. Therefore, we have
minimize
Σq
−
N∑
k=1
log2
(
1+
[Σq]kk
Γq
)
subject to d (Σq) ≻ d⋆q .
(49)
Since the objective function in (49) is Schur-convex, it follows from Definition 3 that the optimal
solution Σ⋆q to (49) is d
(
Σ⋆q
)
= d
⋆
q. Given such a Σ
⋆
q, the constraint in (47) is satisfied if the matrix
Uq= I, implying for Pq in problem P2 the optimal structure Pq = Λ
−1/2
q Σ
1/2
q ; which leads to the
desired expression for Fq =WPq =WΛ
−1/2
q Σ
1/2
q ,W
√
diag(pq). This proves that all the solutions
to problem P1 can be obtained using Fq =W
√
diag(pq).
B Proof of Theorem 2
B.1 Existence of a NE
First, we show the existence of NE for the game G in (20) using the following fundamental game theory
result:
Theorem 3 [14, 16] The strategic noncooperative game G = {Ω, {Xq}q∈Ω, {Φq}q∈Ω} admits at least
one NE if, for all q ∈ Ω: 1) The set Xq is a nonempty compact convex subset of a Euclidean space19,
and 2) The payoff function Φq(x) is continuous on X and quasi-concave20 on Xq.
The game G in (20) always admits at least one NE, because it satisfies conditions required by Theorem
3: 1) The set Pq of feasible strategy profiles, given by (22), is convex and compact (because it is closed
and bounded); 2) The payoff function of each player q in (20) is continuous in p and (strict) concave
in pq ∈ Pq for any given p−q (this follows from the concavity of the log function). Hence, it is also
quasi-concave [33].
B.2 Uniqueness of the NE
To prove the uniqueness we need the following intermediate results.
Definition 4 A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is said to be a Z-matrix if its off-diagonal entries are all non-
positive. A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is said to be a P-matrix if all its principal minors are positive. A
Z-matrix which is also P is called a K-matrix.
Many equivalent characterizations for the above classes of matrices can be given. The interested
reader is referred to [48, 49] for more details. Here we focus on the following two properties.
Lemma 2 ([48, Theorem 3.3.4]) A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is a P-matrix if and only if A does not
reverse the sign of any nonzero vector, i.e.,
xi [Ax]i ≤ 0 for all i ⇒ x = 0. (50)
19A subset Xq of a Euclidean space is compact if and only if it is closed and bounded. The set Xq is convex if
x = θx(0) + (1− θ)x(1) ∈ Xq, ∀x
(0),x(1) ∈ Xq and θ ∈ [0, 1].
20A function f : C ⊆ Rn 7→R is called quasiconvex if its domain C and all its sublevel sets Sα = {x ∈ C | f (x) ≤ α},
for α ∈ R, are convex. A function f is quasi-concave if −f is quasi-convex.
24
Lemma 3 ([48, Lemma 5.3.14]) Let A ∈ Rn×n be a K-matrix and B a nonnegative matrix. Then
ρ(A−1B) < 1 if and only if A−B is a K-matrix.
We provide now sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the NE. First, we derive a necessary
condition for two admissible strategy profiles (whose existence is guaranteed by the first part of the
Theorem) to be different Nash equilibria of the game G in (20). Then we obtain a simple sufficient
condition that guarantees the previous condition is not satisfied; hence guaranteeing that there cannot
be two different Nash equilibria.
Assume that the game G admits two distinct NE points, denoted by p(0),p(1), where p(r) ,
[p
(r)T
1 , . . . ,p
(r)T
Q ]
T and p
(r)
q , [p
(r)
q (1), . . . , p
(r)
q (N)]T , with r = 0, 1, q ∈ Ω. Then, they must satisfy
the following (necessary and sufficient) Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (see, e.g., [33]) for each
q ∈ Ω:
∇pqRq
(
p(r)
)
+
2N+1∑
k=1
µ
(r)
q,k∇pqfq,k(p(r)q ) = 0,
µ
(r)
q,kfq,k(p
(r)
q ) = 0, µrq ≥ 0, fq,k(p(r)q ) ≥ 0,
r = 0, 1, (51)
where µ
(r)
q , [µ
(r)
q,1, . . . , µ
(r)
q,2N+1]
T is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier vector, and
fq,k(p
(r)
q ) =

p
(r)
q (k), if 1 ≤ k ≤ N,
1− 1Tp(r)q , if k = N + 1,
pmaxq (k −N − 1)− p(r)q (k −N − 1), if N + 1 < k ≤ 2N + 1,[∇pqRq (p)]k = log eΓqN |Hqq(k)|
2
1 +
∑Q
r 6=q,r=1 |Hrq(k)|2 pr(k) + Γ−1q |Hqq(k)|2 pq(k)
=
log e
ΓqN
|Hqq(k)|2
1 +
∑Q
r=1 Γ
−δrq
q |Hrq(k)|2pr(k)
,
(52)
with δrq defined as δrq = 1 if r = q and δrq = 0 otherwise. Note that the functions fq,k(p
(r)
q ) are (linear)
concave, thus it must be that, for each p
(1)
q and p
(0)
q , [33]
fq,k(p
(1)
q ) ≤ fq,k(p(0)q ) +
(
p(1)q − p(0)q
)T
∇pq fq,k(p(0)q ), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , 2N + 1}, ∀q ∈ Ω. (53)
Multiplying the first equation of (51) by
(
p
(1)
q − p(0)q
)T
for r = 0, by
(
p
(0)
q − p(1)q
)T
for r = 1, and
summing over r we obtain, for each q ∈ Ω :(
p
(1)
q − p(0)q
)T
∇pqRq
(
p(0)
)
+
(
p
(0)
q − p(1)q
)T
∇pqRq
(
p(1)
)
+
2N+1∑
k=1
[
µ
(0)
q,k
(
p
(1)
q − p(0)q
)T
∇pqfq,k(p(0)q ) + µ1q,k
(
p
(0)
q − p(1)q
)T
∇pqfq,k(p(1)q )
]
= 0.
(54)
The second term in (54) is clearly nonnegative since it is lower bounded by
2N+1∑
k=1
[
µ
(0)
q,k
(
fq,k(p
(1)
q )− fq,k(p(0)q )
)
+ µ
(1)
q,k
(
fq,k(p
(0)
q )− fq,k(p(1)q )
)]
=
2N+1∑
k=1
[
µ
(0)
q,kfq,k(p
(1)
q ) + µ
(1)
q,kfq,k(p
(0)
q )
]
≥ 0, (55)
where we have used the (linearity) concavity of fq,k and the constraints µ
(r)
q,kfq,k(p
(r)
q ) = 0.
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It is now evident that if, for some q, the first term in (54) is strictly positive, then p(0) and p(1)
cannot be both NE points, as (54) would not hold. We will next obtain a simple sufficient condition
for this term to be indeed positive for different points p(0) and p(1); in other words, to guarantee that
there cannot be two different NE solutions.
The positivity condition for the first term in (54) is, for some q ∈ Ω,(
p(1)q − p(0)q
)T (
∇pqRq
(
p(0)
)
−∇pqRq
(
p(1)
))
=
∑
k∈Dq
(
αq
(
k,p(0),p(1)
)
|Hqq(k)|2
(
p(1)q (k)− p(0)q (k)
) Q∑
r=1
Γ
−δrq
q |Hrq(k)|2
(
p(1)r (k)− p(0)r (k)
))
> 0,
(56)
where αq
(
k,p(0),p(1)
)
,
log e
ΓqN
(
1 +
∑
r Γ
−δrq
q |Hrq(k)|2p(0)r (k)
)−1 (
1 +
∑
r Γ
−δrq
q |Hrq(k)|2p(1)r (k)
)−1
, with
αq
(
k,p(0), p(1)
)
> 0, and p(0) 6= p(1). In (56) we have used the fact that, outside Dq, we have p(0)q (k) =
p
(1)
q (k) = 0, where Dq is defined in (27).
Define Kq as the set of carriers in Dq such that the two solutions coincide, i.e., for user q:
Kq ,
{
k ∈ Dq | p(1)q (k) = p(0)q (k)
}
. (57)
Observe that it cannot be that Kq = Dq for all q, since p(0) and p(1) are different solutions by as-
sumption. From (56) it follows that p(0) and p(1) cannot be both NE points if the following sufficient
condition is satisfied:
|Hqq(k)|2
(
p(1)q (k)− p(0)q (k)
) Q∑
r=1
Γ
−δrq
q |Hrq(k)|2
(
p(1)r (k)− p(0)r (k)
)
> 0, ∀k ∈ DqKq and some q ∈ Ω.
(58)
Since in (58) k ∈ DqKq, it follows that p(1)q (k) − p(0)q (k) 6= 0. The sufficient condition is then,
∀k ∈ DqKq and some q ∈ Ω,
1
Γq
|Hqq(k)|2
∣∣∣p(1)q (k)− p(0)q (k)∣∣∣+ sign(p(1)q (k) − p(0)q (k)) Q∑
r 6=q,r=1
|Hrq(k)|2
(
p(1)r (k)− p(0)r (k)
)
> 0, (59)
where sign (·) is the sign function, defined as sign (x) = 1 if x > 0, sign (x) = 0 if x = 0, and
sign (x) = −1 if x < 0. Using the fact that p(1)r (k)− p(0)r (k) = 0 whenever k /∈ Dr, condition (59) can
be equivalently rewritten as, ∀k ∈ DqKq and some q ∈ Ω,∣∣∣p(1)q (k)− p(0)q (k)∣∣∣+ sign (p(1)q (k)− p(0)q (k)) Q∑
r 6=q,r=1
Grq(k)
(
p(1)r (k)− p(0)r (k)
)
> 0, (60)
with
Grq(k) ,
 Γq
|H¯rq(k)|2
|H¯qq(k)|2
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
, if k ∈ Dr,
0, otherwise.
(61)
A more stringent sufficient condition than (60) is obtained by considering the worst possible case, i.e.,
when the second term in (60) is as negative as possible:
∆q(k) >
Q∑
r 6=q,r=1
Grq(k)∆r(k), ∀k ∈ DqKq and some q ∈ Ω, (62)
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where ∆q(k) is defined as
∆q(k) ,
∣∣∣p(1)q (k)− p(0)q (k)∣∣∣ . (63)
Note that, since p(0) 6= p(1) by assumption, it must be
∆q(k) 6= 0, ∀k ∈ DqKq and some q ∈ Ω. (64)
Thus far, we have that condition (62) can not be satisfied by the two different NE points p(0) and
p(1). This means that the following condition needs to be satisfied by such p(0) and p(1):
∆q(kq) ≤
Q∑
r 6=q,r=1
Grq(kq)∆r(kq), for some kq ∈ DqKq and ∀q ∈ Ω, (65)
where for the sake of notation we denoted by kq any subcarrier index in the set DqKq. Introducing
G˜rq(k) ,
{
Grq(k), if k ∈ Dq,
0, otherwise,
(66)
and using the fact that each ∆q(k) = 0 whenever k /∈ Dq and k ∈ Kq, condition (65) becomes
∆q(kq) ≤
Q∑
r 6=q,r=1
G˜rq(kq)∆r(kq), for some kq ∈ DqKq and ∀q ∈ Ω. (67)
We rewrite now condition (67) in a vector form. To this end, we introduce the NQ-length vector
∆ , [∆T (1), . . . ,∆T (N)]T , with ∆(k) , [∆1(k), . . . ,∆Q(k)]
T and the matrices H ∈ RNQ×NQ+ and
H(k) ∈ RQ×Q+ defined as
H , diag
({
H(k)
}N
k=1
)
, and
[
H(k)
]
qr
,
{
G˜rq(k), if k = kq and r 6= q,
0, otherwise.
(68)
Using (68), condition (67) can be equivalently rewritten as(
I−H)∆ ≤ 0. (69)
The proof will be completed by showing that condition (C1) is enough to guarantee that (69) cannot
be satisfied by two different solutions (implying then that (62) is satisfied and that the two different
solutions are not NE points). Since ∆ ≥ 0, inequality (69) implies
∆i
[(
I−H)∆]
i
≤ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , NQ, (70)
where ∆i denotes the i-th component of ∆. It follows from Lemma 2 that, if
I−H is a P-matrix, (71)
inequality (70) provides ∆q(k) = 0, for all q ∈ Ω and k ∈ {1, . . . , N}; which contradicts the initial
assumption that p(0) and p(1) are two different points (see (64)). Therefore, condition (71) is sufficient
to guarantee the uniqueness of the NE.
We complete the proof showing that condition (C1) implies (71). We first introduce the matrices
H ∈ RNQ×NQ+ and H(k) ∈ RQ×Q+ defined as
H , diag
(
{H(k)}Nk=1
)
, and [H(k)]qr ,
{
G˜rq(k), if r 6= q,
0, otherwise.
(72)
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Observe that H(k) in (72) coincides with the matrix defined in (26). Since I −H and I −H are
Z-matrices (cf. Definition 4) and I −H ≥ I −H, where “≥” is intended component-wise, a sufficient
condition for (71) is the following [48]
I−H is a P-matrix. (73)
Given (73), I − H is a K-matrix (cf. Definition 4). It follows from Lemma 3 (using the corre-
spondences: A = I and B = H) that condition (73) is equivalent to ρ (H) < 1; which, exploring the
block-diagonal structure of H in (72) leads to condition (C1). This completes the proof.
Condition (C2) in Corollary 1 is obtained using the following result [50, Corollary 8.1.19]
0 ≤ H(k) ≤ Hmax ⇒ ρ (H(k)) ≤ ρ (Hmax) .
Conditions (C3)-(C4) in Corollary 2 can be obtained as follows. Using [50, Theorem 5.6.9]
ρ (H(k)) = ρ
(
HT (k)
) ≤ ‖H(k)‖ , (74)
where ‖·‖ is any matrix norm [50], a sufficient condition for (C1) is ‖H(k)‖w∞ < 1, with ‖·‖w∞ denoting
the weighted block maximum norm, defined as [50]
‖H(k)‖w∞ , max
q∈Ω
1
wq
∑
r 6=q
wr [H(k)]rq , (75)
and w , [w1, . . . , wQ]
T is any positive vector.
C Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that, in the case of high interference, an orthogonal NE always exists. Then, we prove that
if an orthogonal NE exists and condition (31) is satisfied, at the equilibrium, the available subcarriers
must be distributed among the users according to (32).
To prove that an orthogonal NE always exists in the high interference environment, it is sufficient
to show that, at such a point, all the users do not get any rate increase in sharing some subcarriers.
The power distribution of each user q at any orthogonal NE must satisfy the single-user waterfilling
solution over the subcarriers that are in Iq, i.e.,
p⋆q(k) =

µq −
Γq
snrq
∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2 , k ∈ Iq,
0, otherwise.
q ∈ Ω. (76)
It is straightforward to check that a power distribution as in (76) always exists, provided that
Q ≤ N. For example, in the simple case of Q = N, there are Q! different partitions I1, I2, . . . ,IQ of
the set {1, . . . , N}, corresponding to all the permutations where every user uses only one carrier; which
guarantees (76) to be satisfied.
Observe that a strategy profile as in (76) is not necessarily a NE. However, for any given {snrq}q∈Ω,
there exists a set {inr⋆rq}r 6=q∈Ω, with each inr⋆rq >> 1, such that, for all inrrq ≥ inr⋆rq,
Γq
snrq
∣∣H¯qq(kq)∣∣2 + Pq < Γq 1 + inrrq
∣∣H¯rq(kr)∣∣2 pr(kr)
snrq
∣∣H¯qq(kr)∣∣2 , ∀kr ∈ Ir, kq ∈ Iq, ∀r 6= q ∈ Ω,
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which is sufficient for q-th user to allocate no power over any subcarrier in Ir. Thus, every user q, given
the power distribution of the others, does not have any incentive to change its own power allocation.
Hence, the strategy profile given by (76) is a NE.
We assume now that an orthogonal NE exists and that condition (31) is satisfied. At such a NE
the KKT conditions must hold for all users. Thus, for each q and k, it must be
log e
ΓqN
|Hqq(k)|2
1 +
∑Q
t=1 Γ
−δqt
q pt(k)|Htq(k)|2
≤ µq,
pq(k) ≥ 0, (1/N)
∑N
k=1
pq(k) = 1, µq > 0,
∀q ∈ Ω,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (77)
where we used the fact that at the optimum the power constraint must be satisfied with equality and
Hrq(k) = inr
1/2
rq H¯rq(k), ∀r 6= q and Hqq(k) = snr1/2q H¯qq(k), ∀q ∈ Ω. Note that in the first expression
equality is met if pq(k) > 0. Now, we characterize the set Iq. Assume that kq ∈ Iq. Using (77) we can
write
|Hqq(kq)|2
1 + Γ−1q pq(kq)|Hqq(kq)|2
= µq,
|Hrr(kq)|2
1 + pq(kq)|Hqr(kq)|2 ≤ µr, µq > 0, µr > 0, r 6= q. (78)
It follows that
|Hrr(kq)|2
|Hqq(kq)|2
1 + Γ−1q pq(kq)|Hqq(kq)|2
1 + pq(kq)|Hqr(kq)|2 ≤
µr
µq
≤ |Hrr(kr)|
2
|Hqq(kr)|2
1 + pr(kq)|Hrq(kr)|2
1 + Γ−1r pr(kr)|Hrr(kr)|2
. (79)
Using (31) we have
|Hrr(kq)|2
|Hqq(kq)|2
1 + Γ−1q pq(kq)|Hqq(kq)|2
1 + pq(kq)|Hqr(kq)|2 ≥
|Hrr(kq)|2
|Hqq(kq)|2 , and
|Hrr(kr)|2
|Hqq(kr)|2
1 + pr(kr)|Hrq(kr)|2
1 + Γ−1r pr(kr)|Hrr(kr)|2
≤ |Hrr(kr)|
2
|Hqq(kr)|2 .
(80)
Introducing (80) in (79) we obtain the desired relation.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Under the conditions inrrq << 1 and snrq >> 1, ∀q, r 6= q ∈ Ω, each rate Rq(p) can be approximated
with a negligible error by21
Rq (p) ≈ 1
N
N∑
k=1
log
(
Γ−1q snrq
∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2 pq(k)
1 +
∑Q
r 6=q,r=1 inrrq
∣∣H¯rq(k)∣∣2 pr(k)
)
=
1
N
N∑
k=1
log
(
Gqq(k)pq(k)
1 +
∑Q
r 6=q,r=1Grq(k)pr(k)
)
(81)
whereGqq(k) , Γ
−1
q snrq
∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2, Grq(k) , inrrq ∣∣H¯rq(k)∣∣2 and p ∈ P , {x ∈ RQN++ : 1Txq ≤ 1, xq(k) ≤
pmaxq (k), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀q ∈ Ω
}
. To prove the convexity of the rate region defined in (33), we need
to show that
∃ p ∈ P | αr¯+ βr˜ ≤ R(p), (82)
whenever
r¯ ≤ R(p¯), for some p¯ ∈ P;
r˜ ≤ R(p˜), for some p˜ ∈ P;
(83)
and α, β ≥ 0, α+ β = 1. Starting from (82) and using (83) we have, for each q,
αr¯q + βr˜q ≤ 1
N
N∑
k=1
(
α log
(
Gqq(k)e
x¯q(k)
1 +
∑
r 6=q Grq(k)e
x¯r(k)
)
+ β log
(
Gqq(k)e
x˜q(k)
1 +
∑
r 6=q Grq(k)e
x˜r(k)
))
(84)
21There always exist a set of inrrq and snrq such that all the links transmit over the whole bandwidth.
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where x¯q(k) = loge p¯q(k) and x˜q(k) = loge p˜q(k), ∀q ∈ Ω. Since the function log
((
1 +
∑
r 6=q Grqe
xr
)
G−1qq e
−xq
)
,
with positive {Grq} , is convex in x ∈ RQ ( the function log
(
1 +
∑n
q=1 e
xq
)
is convex in Rn [33]), ex-
pression (84) can be upper-bounded by
αr¯q + βr˜q ≤ 1
N
N∑
k=1
log
(
Gqq(k)p¯
α
q (k)p˜
β
q (k)
1 +
∑
r 6=q Grq(k)p¯
α
r (k)p˜
β
r (k)
)
, Rq(p), (85)
where p is given by pq(k) = p¯
α
q (k)p˜
β
q (k). Observe that p is feasible as p ≤ αp¯+βp˜ ∈ P, where we have
used the geometric-arithmetic inequality [47] and the fact that P is convex.
E Proof of Proposition 4
After showing that the (globally) optimal solution to the scalarized MOP (35) corresponds, for any
given λ > 0, to one of the Pareto optimal points of the MOP (34), we prove that such a solution is a
NE of the game G˜ (λ) defined in (36). We then show that, under conditions of Proposition 3, the game
G˜ (λ) admits a unique NE, for any given λ > 0.
Given the MOP (34), consider the scalarized MOP defined in (35). For any given λ > 0, the
(globally) optimal solution to (35) is a point on the trade-off surface of MOP (34). This follows directly
from the definition of Pareto optimality. Using this result, we now derive the relationship between the
scalarized MOP (35) (and thus the MOP (34)) and the game G˜ (λ) defined in (36). Let p⋆ be the
solution to (35) for a fixed λ > 0. Then
Q∑
q=1
λqRq(p
⋆) >
Q∑
q=1
λqRq(p), ∀p 6= p⋆, pq, p⋆q ∈ Pq,∀q ∈ Ω. (86)
Hence, setting p = (pq,p
⋆
−q), from the above inequality it follows
Rq(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q) +
1
λq
∑
r 6=q
λrRr(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q) ≥ Rq(pq,p⋆−q) +
1
λq
∑
r 6=q
λrRr(pq,p
⋆
−q), ∀q ∈ Ω, (87)
or, equivalently,
Φ˜q(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q) ≥ Φ˜q(pq,p⋆−q), ∀q ∈ Ω. (88)
with Φ˜q(pq,p−q) is given by (37). But (88) is indeed the definition of NE for the game G˜ (λ) given
by (36). Hence, it follows that, for any given λ > 0, the set of Nash equilibria of G˜ (λ) contains
a Pareto optimal point of (34). However, the converse is, in general, not true. Observe that the
payoff functions Φ˜q(pq,p−q) are not quasiconcave in pq and, hence, the classical results of game theory
providing sufficient conditions for the existence of a NE (as, e.g., Theorem 3 in Appendix B) cannot
be used for the game G˜ (λ). Still, the game G˜ (λ) admits at least one NE, since a solution to the
scalarized MOP (35) always exists, for any given λ (the domain P1× . . .×PQ of (35) is compact and
the objective function is continuous in the interior of the domain).
We show now, that under conditions of Proposition 3, the correspondence between the set of Nash
equilibria and the Pareto optimal points of (34) becomes one-to-one, and, moreover, any Pareto optimal
point is, for a proper λ, the unique NE of G˜ (λ). Assume that conditions of Proposition 3 hold true.
Then, the rate region (33) becomes convex, and thus all the points on its boundary can be achieved
solving, for any given λ > 0, the scalarized MOP in (35) [15] and thus, as shown above, using the game
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G˜ (λ) . To complete the proof, we need to show that, in such a case, G˜ (λ) admits a unique NE, for any
given λ > 0.
Since the game G˜ (λ) satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3 (see Appendix B), it is sufficient that
the (sufficient) condition for the uniqueness of the NE (in (54)) holds true. Replacing in (54) the payoff
functions Rq(p) of G with the payoff functions Φ˜q (p) of G˜ (λ) and summing over q, we obtain the
following sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the NE of the game G˜ (λ), ∀p(1) 6= p(0), p(1)q ,p(0)q ∈
Pq,∀q ∈ Ω,
Q∑
q=1
[(
p(1)q − p(0)q
)T
∇pqΦ˜q
(
p(0)
)
+
(
p(0)q − p(1)q
)T
∇pq Φ˜q
(
p(1)
)]
> 0. (89)
Under Proposition 3, Φ˜q (pq,p−q) is given by (37), where each Rq (pq,p−q) can be approximated with
a negligible error by (81). Hence, each Φ˜q (pq,p−q) becomes a strict concave function with respect to
pq, for any given p−q and λ > 0, and thus it satisfies the following inequality [33](
p(1)q − p(0)q
)T
∇pq Φ˜q
(
p(0)q ,p
(0)
−q
)
> Φ˜q(p
(1)
q ,p
(0)
−q)− Φ˜q(p(0)q ,p(0)−q). (90)
Using (81) and (90) we find that condition (89) is satisfied. Hence the game G˜ (λ) admits, for any
λ > 0, a unique NE that corresponds to one of the Pareto optimal points of the MOP (34).
F Proof of Proposition 5
The upper bound of Rq(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q) in (38) comes directly from (37). Thus we prove only the lower bound
of Rq(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q). To this end, we use [47, Corollary 37.6.2] and [47, Lemma 36.2].
Starting from the definition of NE, at any NE p⋆ we have that
Rq(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q) = max
pq∈Pq
Rq(pq,p
⋆
−q) ≥ min
p−q∈P−q
max
pq∈Pq
Rq(pq,p−q). (91)
Inequality (38) comes directly from (91) interchanging the order of the supremum and the infimum
operators. To this end, it is sufficient that, for each q, the functions Rq(pq,p−q) in (21) and the sets
Pq, defined in (22), and P−q , P1 × . . . ×Pq−1 ×Pq+1 × . . . ×PQ, satisfy conditions required by
[47, Corollary 37.6.2] and [47, Lemma 36.2]. The set P1× . . .×PQ is a closed bounded non-empty set
and thus conditions in [47, Corollary 37.6.2] are satisfied. Each function Rq(pq,p−q) is strictly concave
with respect to pq for any given p−q ∈ P−q and convex with respect to p−q for any given pq ∈ Pq.
Hence each Rq(pq,p−q) is a concave-convex function on Pq ×P−q.
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